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REAL PROPERTY-EASEMENTS-RIGHT To TAKE WATER FRoM A PoND AS 
ABsoLuTE, ExCLuSIVE PROFIT IN GRoss-One Divine owned a small natural 
lake and a mill nearby. He dammed the lake, and ran a pipe from it to his 
mill. At times he sold water after it left the mill to defendant's assignor, who 
owned a hotel near the mill. In 1919 Divine sold the lake to plaintiff's assignor, 
reserving to himself the right to dam the lake and draw off water from it, so 
long as tlie level staye~ between high and low water marks. Then Divine sold 
the mill lot to defendant's assignor, who closed it down, but continued to take 
water through the pipe for his hotel.. Plaintiff brought suit for a declaratory 
judgment, an injunction, and damages, claiming that defendant had no right 
to draw water, except for use at his mill. The trial court granted plaintiff an 
injunction, but the appellate division reversed, holding that defendant could 
use the water for any purpose for which it was being used in 1919. On plain-
tiff's appeal, held, affirmed. The right which passed to defendant is a profit 
a prendre, an absolute and exclusive right in defendant to draw water at any 
place and for any purpose within the limits stated in the deed. Loch Shefdrake 
kociates v. Evans, (N.Y. 1954) 118 N.E. (2d) 444. 
The case presents four distinct questions for analysis: (I) whether the 
right to take water from an enclosed lake is an easement or a profit; (2) whether 
the right is assignable; (3) whether on the facts here, the right is appurtenant to 
the mill lot or in gross; and (4) whether the right is exclusive in the grantor 
and his assigns, or in common with the owner of the lake. On the first point, 
1954] RECENT DECISIONS 307 
there is strong minority support for the court's position that the right which 
passed to defendant was a profit.1 The opposite view,2 supported by dicta in 
some New York cases,3 is based on the conclusion that there can be no posses-
sion, 4 and therefore no ownership, of water in streams and lakes. The right 
to take water is thus no more than an easement of way to get to the water. 
It can be argued that, at least in an enclosed lake, water can be brought into 
possession.5 Further, the analogy between the right to take water and such 
recognized species of profits a prendre as the right to cut ice,6 or to hunt or fish,7 
is very strong. The fact that a profit, though held in gross,8 is more readily 
1 Clement v. Rutland Country Club, 94 Vt. 63, 108 A. 843 (1920); Columbia Water-
Power Co. v. Columbia Electric Street R., Light & Power Co., 43 S.C. 154, 20 S.E. 1002 
(1894); CLARK, REAL CoVENANTs AND Orn:ER INTERESTS wmcH "RUN WITH LAND," 2d 
ed., 86, 87 (1~47). Some of the decisions can be traced to a belief that easements could 
not be held in gross; therefore the interest at issue must be a profit. Columbia Water-
Power Co. v. Columbia Electric Street R., Light & Power Co., this note supra. See 
Pierce v. Keator, 70 N.Y. 419 at 422 (1877). At one time there was little distinction 
between an easement and a profit. See Post v. Pearsall, 22 Wend. (N.Y.) 425 at 432 (1839); 
Nellis v. Munson, 108 N.Y. 453 at 459, 15 N.E. 739 (1888); WASHBURN, EAs:EMENTs 
AND SERVITUDES, 4th ed., 8 (1885). Cf. 5 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §450, special note 
(1944). 
2 Race v. Ward, 4 EI. & BI. 702, 119 Eng. Rep. 259 (1855); Manning v. Wasdale, 
5 Ad. & EI. 758, 111 Eng. Rep. 1353 (1836); Goodrich v. Burbank, 12 Allen (94 Mass.) 
459 (1866); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §841, and see §765 (spring water) 
(1939); 28 C.J.S., Easements §3, p. 632 (1941). 
3 Post v. Pearsall, note 1 supra, at 433; Huntington v. Asher, 96 N. Y. 604 at 609, 48 
Am. Rep. 652 (1884). The case of Saratoga State Waters Corp. v. Pratt, 227 N.Y. 429, 
125 N.E. 834 (1920), has been cited as contra [CLARX, REAL COVENANTS AND Orn:ER 
INTERESTS wmcH "RUN WITH LAND," 2d ed., 86, note 64 (1947); 29 YALE L.J. 696 
(1920)]. However, since the court expressly declined to rule on the question, it is 
believed not to be authority for either view. 
4 That "rights" in water in an enclosed lake are based on possession, see Bennett, 
"Concurrent Legal Interests in Water Supplies, 22 So. CAL. L. REv. 349 (1949). The 
article seeks to apply to the area of water rights the ideas formulated in HoHFELD, SoMB 
FuNDAMI!NTAL LEGAL CoNCEPTIONS (1923). See also Hohfeld, "Faulty Analysis in 
Easement and License Cases," 27 YALE L.J. 66 (1917). 
5 Bennett, "Concurrent Legal Interests in Water Supplies," 22 So. CAL. L. REv. 349 
at 355, 356 (1949). The common law rule, note 2 supra, contained a well-recognized 
exception where water was trapped in a cistern or reservoir. Embrey v. Owen, 6 Exch. 
353 at 369, 155 Eng. Rep. 579 at 585 (1851); 2 BLACKST., CoMM., Jones ed., 14 (1915). 
See Wiel, "Running Water," 22 HARV. L. REv. 190 at 202 (1909). It could then become 
the subject of property, and would be regarded as personal property. Wallace v. Winfield, 
98 Kan. 651, 159 P. 11 (1916); Syracuse v. Stacey, 169 N.Y. 231 at 245, 62 N.E. 354 
(1901). See 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §§721, 841 (1939). In Saratoga State 
Waters Corp. v. Pratt, note 3 supra, at 444, the right to take water from cisterns or wells 
was assumed to be a profit. 
6 Huntington v. Asher, note 3 supra; Mitchell v. D'Olier, 68 N.J.L. 375, 53 A. 467 
(1902). 
7Allright v. Cortright, 64 N.J.L. 330, 45 A. 634 (1900); Minnesota Valley Gun Club 
v. Northline Corp., 207 Minn. 126, 290 N.W. 222 (1940); Winslow v. Fleischner, llO 
Ore. 554, 223 P. 922 (1924). See Hahner, "An Analysis of Profits a Prendre," 25 ORE. 
L. REv. 217 at 220 (1946). 
s Profits in gross are, of course, assignable, 28 C.J.S., Easements §3, p. 632 (1941), 
and profits appurtenant pass with the land, 28 C.J.S., Easements §3, p. 633 (1941); 
CLARK, REAL CoVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WlilCH "RUN WITH LAND," 2d ed., 65 
(1947). 
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assignable than an easement has been suggested as another reason for consider-
ing the right to take water as a profit.9 By its holding, the court in the princi-
pal case managed to avoid very neatly the troublesome question whether ease-
ments in gross are,assignable in New York. There are no square holdings on 
this point, and dicta is conflicting.10 The writers on the subject seem generally 
to favor assignability.11 
The New York court declined to consider evidence that the water right at 
issue was appurtenant to a mill lot, because it felt that the granting deed, silent 
about a dominant tenement, was free from ambiguity, and must be interpreted 
in a vacuum. While such a conclusion is always somewhat subjective, and 
can be criticized as a poor way to arrive at grantor's intent12-the goal of the 
process of interpretation of any deed13-this version of the "plain meaning" 
rule seems firmly entrenched in New York.14 On the other hand, it is well 
established in New York that an easement in gross will not be presumed where 
it can fairly be construed to be appurtenant to land.15 Silence as to a dominant 
estate is not much of an indication of intent one way or the other. A better 
indicator would seem to be an analysis of the physical use and enjoyment of the 
profit as granted.16 Be that as it may, however, the more important point is 
that nothing in the nature of a profit in gross requires (as the court would seem 
9 CLARK, REAL CoVEN~s AND Ormm lNrnREsTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND," 2d 
ed., 87 (1947). · 
lOThat they are assignable, see City of New York v. Law, 125 N.Y. 380, 26 N.E. 
471 (1891); Antonopulos v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 261 App. Div. 564, 26 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 403 (1941). That they are not assignable, see Saratoga State Waters Corp. v. 
Pratt, note 3 supra; Atlantic Mills of Rhode Island v. New York Central R. Co., 221 App. 
Div. 386, 223 N.Y.S. 206 (1927), affd. 248 N.Y. 535, 162 N.E. 514 (1928); Mathews 
Slate Co. of New York v. Advance Industrial Supply Co., 185 App. Div. 74, 172 N.Y.S. 
830 (1918); Weigold v. Bates, 144 Misc. 395, 258 N.Y.S. 695 (1932); Post v. Pearsall, 
note 3 supra. 
1129 YALE L.J. 218 (1919); 32 YALE L.J. 813 (1923); Simes, "The Assignability 
of Easements in Gross in American Law," 22 MicH. L. REv. 521 (1924); 17 lowA L. REv. 
235 (1932); Kloek, "Assignability and Divisibility of Easements in Gross," 22 Cm-KENT 
L. REv. 239 (1944); Welsh, "The Assignability of Easements in Gross," 12 Umv. Cm. 
L. REv. 276 (1945); CLARK, REAL CoVENANTS AND Ormm lNrnru;STs WHICH "RUN 
WITH LAND," 2d ed., c. 3 (1947). See cases collected in 130 A.L.R. 1253 (1941). 
12 See Powell, "Construction of Written Instruments,'' 14 hm. L.J. 199, 309, 397 
(1939), 25 A.B.A.J. 185 (1939); 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §242 (1940). But cf., id., 
§241, comment a; Sither, "Statutory Interpretation and the Plain Meaning Rule," 37 KY. 
L.J. 66 (1948). 
13 3 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §241, comment c (1940). 
14 Wilson v. Ford, 209 N.Y. 186, 102 N.E. 614 (1913); Uihlein v. Matthews, 172 
N.Y. 154, 64 N.E. 792 (1902); French v. Carhart, I N.Y. 96 (1847); 2 New York Real 
Property Law (McKinney, 1945) §240, subdiv. 3. 
15 Wilson v. Ford, note 14 supra, at 196; Atlantic Mills of Rhode Island v. New York 
Central R. Co., note 10 supra, at 389; Antonopulos v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., note 
IO supra, at 569; Waters of White Lake, Inc. v. Fricke, 282 App. Div. 333 at 369, 26 
N.Y.S. (2d) 400 (1953). See 89 A.L.R. ll87 at ll89 (1934). See also 3 TIFFANY, 
REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §759, p. 207 (1939). 
16 See Hahner, "An Analysis of Profits a Prendre," 25 Oru;. L. REv. 217 at 225, 226 
(1946). Cf. Bigelow, "The Content of Covenants in Leases," 12 MICH. L. REv. 639 
(1914). 
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to believe)17 that the rights acquired be unlimited, absolute, or exclusive.18 
Quite to the contrary, the law appears to be settled that a profit is in common, 
unless expressly made exclusive.19 It is to be hoped that courts in the future 
will not construe easements or profits as unlimited and exclusive unless they 
were so intended. 
Stephen ]. Martin, S.Ed. 
17Principal case at 447, 448. 
18 This impression might be received as a negative implication of English cases which 
hold that a profit appurtenant cannot be unlimited, or "without stint." Bailey v. Stephens, 
12 C.B. (n.s.) 91 at 110, 142 Eng. Rep. 1077 (1862); Chesterfield v. Harris, [1908] 2 
Ch. 397 at 421, 423. 
19 5 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §486 (1944); 3 TII'FANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., 
§811 (1939); Hahner, "An Analysis of Profits a Prendre," 25 Orui. L. REv. 217 at 227-
229 (1946); 29 CALIF. L. REv. 632 (1941); 133 A.L.R. 1200 (1941). 
